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Quasi Governments and Inchoate Law: 
Berle’s Vision of Limits on Corporate Power 
Elizabeth Pollman* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Berle X Symposium essay gives prominence to distinguished 
corporate law scholar Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and his key writings of the 1950s 
and 1960s. Berle is most famous for his work decades earlier, in the 1930s, 
with Gardiner Means on the topic of the separation of ownership and 
control,1 and for his great debate of corporate social responsibility with E. 
Merrick Dodd.2 Yet the world was inching closer to our contemporary one 
in terms of both business and technology in Berle’s later years and his 
work from this period deserves attention. 
For corporate law scholars who set their sights facing ahead rather 
than behind, this mid-twentieth century period of business law literature 
may appear as a blank space in the annals of scholarly inquiry into 
corporations. Perhaps the best-known description of this time comes from 
Yale law professor Bayless Manning who wrote in 1962 that “corporation 
law, as a field of intellectual effort, is dead in the United States.”3 
According to Manning: 
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 1. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 2. Compare A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 
(1931), with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1145 (1932), and A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1365 (1932). For discussion of the Berle–Dodd debate, see William W. Bratton & Michael L. 
Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 
J. CORP. L. 99, 122–35 (2008); Charles R. T. O’Kelley, Merrick Dodd and the Great Depression: A 
Few Historical Corrections, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 513 (2019). 
 3. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE 
L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962). 
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When American law ceased to take the ‘corporation’ seriously, the 
entire body of law that had been built upon that intellectual construct 
slowly perforated and rotted away. We have nothing left but our great 
empty corporation statutes—towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, 
internally welded together and containing nothing but wind.4 
Although traditional corporate law may have quieted to an empty city 
blown by winds, Berle’s work during this mid-twentieth century period 
reflects a lively intellectual effort to describe and predict a new path of 
laws affecting business corporations. By the early 1950s, Berle had 
rejoined academic life after years in government service, including a stint 
as U.S. Ambassador to Brazil.5 When he returned to scholarly writing, 
Berle resumed exploring the concentration of power that corporations 
represented in U.S. society, and did so in the post-Depression era with 
particular sensitivity to the potential for expanding legal liabilities and 
responsibilities.6 
In a series of publications, Berle repeatedly highlighted the problem 
of economic power in corporations. He wrote about the issue as one of 
“bigness” as an absolute matter and as relative to particular industries in 
terms of concentration.7 In a 1958 article, he noted: “Practically all of 
American industry is now held in corporate form. Probably two-thirds of 
it is held or operated by not more than 600 large corporations.”8 Following 
                                                     
 4. Id.; see also JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN 
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970, at 10, 155 (1970) (discussing Manning’s perspective 
and noting that “Manning struck his appraisal in the 1960’s, after a generation’s stable acceptance of 
the enabling-act type of corporation law, which emerged as a national norm out of developments at 
the turn of the century”); Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal 
Change, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 305, 305 (2013) (explaining “the distinctive features of corporate law in the ‘long 1950s,’ why the 
field appeared vibrant at the time, and how later changes in the American political economy led most 
to eventually agree with Manning’s diagnosis”). 
 5. Robert B. Thompson, Adolf Berle During the New Deal: The Braintruster as an Intellectual 
Jobber, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 663 (2019). 
 6. See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 
433, 433 (1962) [hereinafter Berle, Modern Functions] (discussing how later generations discussed 
his work as “folklore” but he had lived through the early twentieth century, “a corporate and financial 
world without the safeguards of the Securities and Exchange Commission, without systemization and 
forced publicity of corporate accounting, without (more or less) consistent application of antitrust 
laws, without discouragement of financial pyramiding”). 
 7. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Legal Problems of Economic Power, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 4, 4 (1960) 
[hereinafter Berle, Economic Power]. For a contrasting view of bigness as unavoidable, with the “real 
problem” as making sure that “it be possible for small enterprises to exist side by side with the giants,” 
see PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY: THE ANATOMY OF INDUSTRIAL ORDER 342–44 
(Transaction Publishers 1993) (1950). 
 8. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., “Control” in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1958) 
[hereinafter Berle, Control]; see also Berle, Modern Functions, supra note 6, at 434 (“Within the 
industrial sphere the degree of concentration has remained about the same. But the aggregate of 
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this assertion, he conceded, “history seems to have vindicated” the late 
Professor E. Merrick Dodd that “directors, or ‘management,’ of any of 
these corporations are no longer merely stewards . . . for their 
stockholders.”9 Large corporations had “outgrown the ‘incorporated 
partnership’ phase” of business history and Berle concluded that the 
directors of these large corporations “are also stewards for the employed 
personnel, for customers and suppliers, and indeed for that section of the 
community affected by their operations.”10 The community had grown to 
expect that goods and services would be supplied at an “acceptable” price, 
that employment opportunities would be provided, and that industries 
would keep pace with technological progress.11 In Berle’s eyes, “the huge 
modern corporation fit[] awkwardly” with free market economic theory.12 
At the forefront of his 1950s and 1960s writings were two additional 
concepts describing mechanisms by which the law could control 
corporations and reign in their encroachments on individual liberty. The 
first was the notion of corporations as quasi governments, subject to the 
application of constitutional principles as state actors.13 The second was 
the idea of “inchoate law,” a term coined in a seminar at Columbia Law 
School to describe how the community “moves into action, either through 
the courts or through the legislature, or through some other form of 
political intervention” when corporations do not fulfill their expected 
social roles.14 
Both concepts are worthy of excavation. From a twenty-first century 
perspective, the first concept, of corporations as quasi governments, 
represents a path largely untaken, a prophecy unfulfilled as of yet. It puts 
into sharp relief the vast expansion of corporate rights rather than 
responsibilities that developed since the 1970s, and it offers a potential 
logic, albeit a problematic one, for subjecting corporations to additional 
limits or preventing the further expansion of corporate rights. 
                                                     
industry, both in size and in relative importance, has established undoubted dominance. Concentration 
within it is thus markedly more powerful relative to total production and in the total economic sense 
today than it was in 1932.”). 
 9. Berle, Control, supra note 8, at 1212. 
 10. Id. As a corollary, Berle suggested that the holders of corporate control had certain 
responsibilities as well. Id. at 1215 (“[Control] is essentially a variety of political process—non-statist 
and therefore, in our vocabulary, ‘private,’ but with substantial public responsibilities. The holder of 
control is not so much the owner of a proprietary right as the occupier of a power-position.”). 
 11. Berle, Economic Power, supra note 7, at 7. 
 12. Berle, Modern Functions, supra note 6, at 436. 
 13. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of 
Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 948–53 (1952) 
[hereinafter Berle, Constitutional Limitations]. 
 14. Berle, Economic Power, supra note 7, at 7–8. 
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The second concept, of corporations subject to “inchoate law” that 
waits ready to spring into action when corporations fail to self-regulate 
their impacts on citizens, represents a largely forgotten predecessor of 
subsequent writings by other business law scholars on corporate law 
federalism,15 “bubble laws,”16 “quack corporate governance,”17 and 
“publicness.”18 Berle’s concept of inchoate law might be fruitfully 
connected to this significant scholarly work. Further, the concept of 
inchoate law provides a lens for understanding calls from the business 
community to embrace social responsibility that have followed in recent 
decades. 
This essay proceeds by engaging each concept in turn and showing 
its relevance for contemporary issues. First, I observe that Berle’s 
prediction about corporations as quasi governments, subject to 
constitutional constraints, has largely failed to materialize. The immense 
power wielded by twenty-first century media and technology giants, such 
                                                     
 15. See, e.g., John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. 
L.J. 1345 (2012); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REG., 
Spring 2003, at 26; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from 
History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793 (2006); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The 
Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619 (2006); Mark J. Roe, 
Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005); Renee M. Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its 
Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879 (2006); Renee 
M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation, and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 107 (2005); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate 
Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625 (2004). 
 16. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 
75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1997); Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of 
Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309 (2011); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does 
The Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707 (2009); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political 
Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk 
Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019 (2012); Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the 
Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393 (2006); A.C. Pritchard, The SEC 
at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073 (2005); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 
40 HOUS. L. REV. 77 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: 
A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002); Charles K. 
Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 17. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance 
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making 
of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). 
 18. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, ‘‘Publicness” in Contemporary 
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An 
Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1629 (2014); Hillary A. Sale & Robert B. 
Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 
487 (2015); Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, 
The New “Public” Corporation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2011, at 137; Cary Martin Shelby, 
Are Hedge Funds Still Private? Exploring Publicness in the Face of Incoherency, 69 SMU L. REV. 
405 (2016). 
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as Facebook and Twitter, has raised the issue anew but with challenges 
and complexities to applying the First Amendment that even Berle might 
find troubling. The concept of corporations as quasi governments is 
perhaps better regarded as a counterpoint to advocacy for greater 
expansions of corporate rights, reminding modern thinkers that it is 
possible to regard corporations not only as private right bearers but also as 
public actors. Second, I uncover insights from Berle’s writings on inchoate 
law and connect them to current literature, showing that they offer a 
historical foundation for recent calls for corporations to embrace a more 
capacious view of their responsibilities. 
I. CORPORATIONS AS QUASI GOVERNMENTS 
Berle engaged in the dangerous practice of making predictions. He 
vigorously defended this practice without apology, noting he believed that 
as lawyers and legal scholars “we would be very remiss if we did not” 
predict the direction of the law and he accepted that some of his predictions 
might prove to be wrong.19 
In some respects, ranging from his musings on the pervasive cultural 
“impact of a new gadget called ‘TV’”20 to his intuition that American law 
was on a path toward responding to “the problem of discrimination on the 
ground of race or religion,”21 Berle seems prescient in hindsight or at least 
an astute observer of cultural shifts at the time. 
Yet, the law has also developed quite contrary to his predictions. 
Chief among those that have proven wrong is his prediction that courts 
would impose constitutional limits on corporations and their activities. In 
the years following Berle’s prediction, corporations have instead used 
court battles to vastly expand their own rights. 
This Part examines Berle’s writings on quasi governments in light of 
subsequent legal developments and evaluates their potential utility in 
current debates. 
                                                     
 19. Berle, Economic Power, supra note 7, at 22 (“If we do not [predict what the law will be], I 
myself think we ought to go out of business and I ought to try to get a job at—well, maybe, the RAND 
Corporation in California, where I can shove things into a machine and go to sleep happily while an 
IBM pulls out the answer at the end. In other words, I wouldn’t need to be a lawyer. I am prepared to 
defend that against all comers.”). 
 20. Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Decision-Making and Social Control, 24 BUS. LAW. 149, 156 
(1968) [hereinafter Berle, Corporate Decision-Making]. 
 21. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Developing Law of Corporate Concentration, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 
639, 659 (1952) [hereinafter Berle, Corporate Concentration]. 
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A. Berle’s Prediction of Constitutional Limits on Corporate Action 
Inspired by cases that were relatively recent at the time, Berle 
predicted a different world than the one we inherited. Berle saw the 
beginning of a possible trend in Shelley v. Kraemer,22 and Marsh v. 
Alabama,23 in which the U.S. Supreme Court refused to enforce racially 
discriminatory covenants on property transfer and applied constitutional 
principles to a company town owned and operated by a corporation. As a 
matter of longstanding principle, for the Constitution to apply there must 
be state action.24 Rarely does a private actor rise to that level—but where 
others saw limits, Berle saw possibility. 
Starting from historical precedent, Berle observed that in early 
English law corporations were “in form, in fact, and in legal cognizance a 
device by which the political state got something done.”25 In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in England and in the U.S., 
corporations resembled “public authorities”: “A ferry had to be run; a 
harbor needed wharves; a colony needed to be developed; a particular line 
of industry needed encouragement.”26 
During this period, corporations were regarded as “an agency of the 
state,” including “when, in 1787, the United States drafted its 
Constitution.”27 Berle pointed to Madison’s notes from the Constitutional 
Convention, suggesting that the delegates did not support giving the 
federal government power to charter corporations because they were 
“commonly regarded as state monopolies” and “a powerful agency by 
which the nascent Federal Government might enter, affect, perhaps even 
control and dominate the commercial field.”28 Later, in McCulloch v. 
Maryland,29 the Supreme Court held that Congress has power to charter 
corporations, Berle observed, “but always with the underlying limitation 
                                                     
 22. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
state courts from enforcing racially discriminatory covenants prohibiting transfer of real property); 
Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 949–50. 
 23. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946) (“Whether a corporation or a municipality owns 
or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the 
community in such manner that the channels of communication remain free.”); Berle, Constitutional 
Limitations, supra note 13, at 953. 
 24. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). For discussions of the state action doctrine, 
see LARRY ALEXANDER & PAUL HORTON, WHOM DOES THE CONSTITUTION COMMAND? A 
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS WITH PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS (1988); G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual 
History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 
333 (1997); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (1985). 
 25. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 944. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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that a federal charter may be granted as a means of performing some 
function or exercising some power delegated to the United States.”30 
State-chartered corporations likewise “were agencies of the 
chartering state,” and understood as such, according to Berle, until the 
latter part of the nineteenth century by which time states had adopted 
general corporation laws.31 The “underlying premise” still remained that 
chartering corporations was “a state act designed to further a state purpose, 
namely the encouragement of trade and commerce,” but corporations were 
also by then “regarded as a private institution.”32 The corporate form “had 
virtually become a mere method of business organization” and “[t]he 
operations of the small shop, or of the small factory, did not attain a power-
position capable of invading personality save in rare instances, and these 
were chiefly in the field of railroads and public utilities.”33 
Courts dealt with the concentrated power of railroads as a matter of 
classic public utility regulation or as regulation of interstate commerce 
under the commerce clause, including in cases involving racial 
discrimination.34 In 1903, Congress amended the Interstate Commerce Act 
to make it unlawful for any carrier to subject any person to undue or 
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.35 Although Congress may have 
aimed at issues concerning rebates and preferential rates and services, the 
Supreme Court, in Mitchell v. United States, held the Interstate Commerce 
Act gave all travelers the right to equal treatment, but did not address the 
question of segregation.36 At the time of Berle’s writing in 1952, he noted 
that “legal controversy as to what is ‘equal treatment’ required to be 
afforded individuals by common carrier regulations is still going on.”37 
Berle saw in this legal development the seed of a larger change; in 
his words, “a quiet translation of constitutional law from the field of 
political to the field of economic rights.”38 He observed that an effect of 
Mitchell v. United States was to subject corporate policies and practices to 
legal limits, allowing such policies and practices so long as they were 
                                                     
 30. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 945. 
 31. Id. at 946. 
 32. Id.; see also Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 
344 (1947) (“The legal doctrine of corporate personality was built around the idea of a sovereign grant 
of certain attributes of personality to a definable group, engaged in an enterprise.”). 
 33. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 946. 
 34. Id. at 947 (discussing Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878), and Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio 
R.R., 218 U.S. 71 (1910)). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. (discussing Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941)). 
 37. Id. For a discussion of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its aftermath, 
see MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE (2010). 
 38. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 942. 
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“reasonable” and did not “burden interstate commerce.”39 And, “[i]n 
practice, there is little real difference between this criterion of 
‘reasonableness’ and the criterion of ‘equal protection of the laws’ applied 
to state action.”40 
Furthermore, Berle looked to Marsh v. Alabama involving the direct 
application of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to 
corporate action and practices.41 In Marsh, a sheriff’s deputy of a company 
town, paid by the corporation, arrested a Jehovah’s Witness for 
distributing religious literature on its streets as trespass on private 
property.42 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction for trespass, 
holding that although the company town was owned and operated by a 
private corporation, it was performing a “public function” and therefore 
subject to constitutional limitations.43 The Court noted that “the 
corporation can no more deprive people of freedom of press and religion 
than it can discriminate against commerce.”44 
Shelley v. Kraemer provided further evidence to Berle of shifting 
tides in state action doctrine.45 In Shelley, the Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a state court from enforcing a racially 
discriminatory covenant on transferring real property.46 The covenant was 
a private contractual term; enforcement of it invoked state power. 
Beyond explaining this line of logic and authority, Berle was 
stepping into the realm of prediction making.47 He recognized that “[t]he 
case remains open, so far as authority is concerned, where the corporation 
is able to enforce its rule, or carry out its practice, without calling on the 
state to assist in its enforcement.”48 The open question had enormous 
implications, as Berle recognized, because “most corporate practices and 
                                                     
 39. Id. at 948. 
 40. Id. Berle further observed that the rule did not seem limited to public utilities. Id. (“A rule or 
practice, for example, imposed by an oil company, a chain of gasoline stations or even chain stores, 
could conceivably burden interstate commerce quite as much as any regulation of a railroad.”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 503–04 (1946). 
 43. Id. at 506–07. 
 44. Id. at 507 n.4. 
 45. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 949–50. 
 46. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). 
 47. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 950 (“There is a gap in direct application 
of constitutional rules to corporate action which the courts have not yet bridged.”); see also Berle, 
Corporate Concentration, supra note 21, at 658 (“Taking the two lines of argument—that flowing 
from Shelley v. Kraemer and that flowing from Marsh v. Alabama, the conclusion seems reasonably 
predictable.”). 
 48. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 950. 
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regulations are directly applied” without invoking state enforcement 
power.49 
The key to understanding how the law would develop, in Berle’s 
view, was to recognize that the economic power concentrated in 
corporations, in combination with their state-granted charters, had public 
implications and the potential to impinge on individual liberties. First, 
states chartered corporations. The same residual power kept by states that 
could “justify the right of a legislature to change or modify stockholders’ 
rights” implied that the state expected that “the corporation will not 
exercise its power . . . in a manner forbidden the state itself.”50 Second, 
corporations would not be subject to constitutional tests “merely” because 
they operated with state-granted charters.51 There would be no wrong, 
according to Berle, without “very considerable concentration of economic 
power in a given area.”52 That type of concentration meant that individuals 
had “either no choice or a very limited choice of suppliers of such goods 
or services.”53 Once a corporation wielded that level of actual power, its 
policies and practices were effectively “public” rules.54 
In sum, Berle predicted that courts would apply constitutional 
provisions to corporations as limits on their activities when these two 
preconditions were met: “the undeniable fact that the corporation was 
created by the state and the existence of sufficient economic power 
concentrated in this vehicle to invade the constitutional right of an 
individual to a material degree.”55 Berle expected the most likely 
circumstance in which courts would apply constitutional limits would be 
where a large corporation with concentrated economic power had 
discriminated against consumers of its goods and services.56 He wrote: 
                                                     
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 952. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 951. 
 53. Id. at 952. 
 54. Id. at 953; see also Berle, Corporate Concentration, supra note 21, at 643 (“[T]he great 
corporation, as monopoly or in a concentrate, has become increasingly an arm of the state, held to 
certain of the limitations imposed on the state itself by the Bill of Rights requiring the concentrate to 
respect certain individual rights and to assure a measure of equal protection of the laws within the 
scope of its power, as well as to fulfill the economic function it has undertaken of production, supply 
and service.”). 
 55. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 943. Berle gave credit to other thinkers 
around this time, such as Professor Arthur Miller who had suggested similar ideas. Berle, Economic 
Power, supra note 7, at 9 (noting that in PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1959), 
Arthur Miller had suggested that corporations are “public organisms” and that courts could “apply 
fundamental limitations of due process of law to the use of any ‘governing power’”). 
 56. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 954. 
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If, for instance, a corporation dealing in goods or services essential 
to the life of an individual discriminates against a customer on the 
ground of race or in a matter which invades his Constitutional right 
of freedom of speech or religion, it would seem that there is a 
violation of the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.57 
Perhaps less likely, in his view, would be application of 
constitutional provisions when a corporation had discriminated in its 
provision of access to business opportunity.58 He gave as an example that 
large corporations such as General Motors and Standard Oil were in a 
position to potentially discriminate in “the whole complicated gamut of 
operation from distribution back to production.”59 From decisions about 
sales agreements to the distribution of products necessary for small 
businesses to render their services, Berle saw in these relationships the 
potential for discrimination and encroachment on individual liberty.60 
B. An Era of Statutory Anti-Discrimination Laws 
Berle’s mid-twentieth century work implicated a broader question: 
Should we protect the individual by judicial application of constitutional 
provisions to corporations or by legislation? Professor Herbert Wechsler, 
in his 1959 Holmes lecture at Harvard Law School, made a prediction that 
has hit closer to subsequent legal developments: 
Many understandably would like to perceive in the primary and 
covenant decisions a principle susceptible of broad extension, 
applying to the other power aggregates in our society limitations of 
the kind the Constitution has imposed on government. My colleague 
A. A. Berle, Jr., has, indeed, pointed to the large business corporation, 
which after all is chartered by the state and wields in many areas more 
power than the government, as uniquely suitable for choice as the 
next subject of such application. I doubt that the courts will yield to 
such temptations; and I do not hesitate to say that I prefer to see the 
issues faced through legislation, where there is room for drawing 
lines that courts are not equipped to draw. If this is right the two 
decisions I have mentioned will remain, as they now are, ad hoc 
determinations of their narrow problems, yielding no neutral 
principles for their extension or support.61 
                                                     
 57. Berle, Corporate Concentration, supra note 21, at 658. 
 58. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 954. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
31 (1959). 
2019] Quasi Governments and Inchoate Law 627 
As Professor Wechsler suggested, instead of expanding Marsh v. 
Alabama and Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court has narrowed their 
reach, although not explicitly overruling them.62 The Court has heard 
several dozen “state action” cases, defining the scope of the Constitution’s 
application on a case-by-case basis, establishing several lines of cases with 
limited breadth and blurry edges about when a private individual or entity 
is deemed a state actor.63 Observers have characterized the case law as a 
“doctrinal briar patch”;64 the Court itself has referred to the state action 
doctrine as “difficult terrain.”65 Through all of this, the Court has not 
broadly interpreted large corporations with economic power as state actors 
subject to constitutional provisions, as Berle predicted. In fact, the Court 
has never again ruled as it did in Marsh that the Constitution required large 
corporations as such to respect individual civil liberties.66 
Near the end of Berle’s life, he witnessed the development of anti-
discrimination laws that came about through the legislative process.67 
Most notably, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides for the equal 
enjoyment of any place of public accommodation without discrimination 
and prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, national 
origin, religion, or sex.68 When a business challenged the constitutionality 
of the public accommodations provisions of the Act, the Supreme Court 
                                                     
 62. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928, 937, 939 n.21 (1982) (recognizing that 
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Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur cases deciding 
when private action might be deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency.”). 
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RIGHTS 271 (2018); see also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“It is, of course, a 
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truisms are not always unexceptionably true, and an exception to this one was recognized almost 30 
years ago in Marsh v. Alabama . . . .”). 
 67. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10–11 
(1965) [hereinafter Berle, Property, Production and Revolution] (discussing the Civil Rights Act). 
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (2012). 
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swiftly rejected the claims of the business and sustained the Act’s 
validity.69 Berle pointed out that the “old concept of ‘public utilities’” 
could have supported the accommodations provision of the Act, but that 
Congress had instead used the rationale of the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment.70 He seemed to view this development as 
generally affirming his earlier intuitions about the direction of the law.71 
Moreover, he did not give up on his prediction, noting that “[t]he passage 
of the Civil Rights Act does not, of course prevent the application of 
constitutional limitations along the lines suggested in my article . . . .”72 
In subsequent years, Congress enacted additional statutes, including: 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, which prohibits 
discrimination against employees 40 years and older;73 Title VIII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended, commonly referred to as the Fair 
Housing Act, which prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, and 
financing of dwellings, based on race, national origin, religion, sex, 
familial status, and disability;74 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of 
disabilities and requires that employers reasonably accommodate 
individuals with disabilities who can otherwise perform a job, among other 
protections.75 
These statutes create a patchwork of anti-discrimination laws that can 
apply to corporations as employers, public accommodations, landlords, 
and more, but do not specifically target corporations or concentrated 
economic power as such.76 The large body of statutory anti-discrimination 
laws do not fully parallel constitutional restraints on governments, but they 
                                                     
 69. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261–62 (1964). 
 70. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, supra note 67, at 11 n.32. 
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 73. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. 
 75. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 
 76. For an overview of anti-discrimination laws, see ROY L. BROOKS ET AL., THE LAW OF 
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have established a reach that case-by-case determinations in state action 
doctrine have not achieved.77 
C. Corporations as Quasi Governments Redux 
One longstanding obstacle to applying constitutional principles to 
corporations has been the complicated task of drawing lines between when 
private entities constitute state actors and when they do not. Notably, 
Berle’s own writings were short on details in this regard. He does not 
explain when there would be “sufficient economic power” to find that a 
corporation encroached on an individual’s constitutional right to “a 
material degree,” such that the corporation should be deemed a state 
actor.78 
Contemporary debates have raised anew the issue of applying 
constitutional provisions to corporations and have surfaced additional 
concerns. One of the most salient of these modern debates is about the role 
and regulation of social media and other major digital platforms and 
technology corporations, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google. 
The dominance of these companies’ products and services and the 
stretch of their influence is nearly irrefutable. In a remark echoing Berle’s 
writings, Facebook CEO-founder, Mark Zuckerberg, admitted: “In a lot of 
ways Facebook is more like a government than a traditional company. We 
have this large community of people, and more than other technology 
companies we’re really setting policies.”79 According to one measure, 
“[s]ixty-two percent of Americans get their news through social media, 
and most of it via Facebook; a third of all traffic to media sites flows from 
Google.”80 Americans not only consume news, but also post vast amounts 
of their own content online. As of 2018, about a quarter of U.S. adults 
report that they are Twitter users.81 Two-thirds of U.S. adults report that 
they are Facebook users, with about three-quarters of those users accessing 
                                                     
 77. For a discussion of the “gap between the constitutional restraints on governments and the 
limitations imposed on corporations by statute,” see Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., Corporations and 
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 78. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 943. 
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the site on a daily basis.82 Nearly three-quarters of U.S. adults use the 
video-sharing site YouTube, owned by Google’s parent company.83 
Some courts and scholars have begun to consider whether these 
companies are providing today’s versions of town halls and public squares, 
and accordingly whether the First Amendment should apply to them.84 
Issues concerning access to speak and listen through these technologies, 
and due process in imposing any restrictions to these benefits are at stake.85 
Other commentators have raised an interesting concern about 
applying the First Amendment in this context: the corporations are serving 
a useful social role in content moderation.86 If the companies providing 
online platforms were deemed state actors, the First Amendment would 
constrict their practices of curating content, enforcing online community 
norms, removing obscene and violent content, and regulating hate speech, 
bullying, and terrorism.87 In short, to take away the ability of online 
platforms to moderate content would “likely create an internet nobody 
wants.”88 Furthermore, some commentators and policymakers have 
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It, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/technology/regulating-tech-
companies.html (noting the largest technology companies are “being called upon to police free speech, 
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 88. Klonick, supra note 84, at 1659; see also HEATHER WHITNEY, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT 
INST., SEARCH ENGINES, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND THE EDITORIAL ANALOGY 29 (2018) https:// 
knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Heather_Whitney_Search_Engines_Editorial_Analogy
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be unachievable by a platform constrained by the First Amendment . . . . If the First Amendment rights 
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pushed for these corporations to take an even more active role, taking 
responsibility for the content they distribute in order to combat the 
proliferation of “fake news” and propagandistic speech and advertising.89 
In some regards, this discourse echoes Berle’s suggestion that society 
had shifted from a dyadic model consisting of the state and the individual 
to a pluralist model mediated by other actors.90 But it also highlights the 
complexity of conceptualizing private companies that provide online 
infrastructure and sites for public discourse in a digital world.91 There are 
concerns that Berle did not foresee about applying constitutional 
limitations to corporate actors, even those that wield significant power 
over individuals. And there is the possibility of reorienting understandings 
of the First Amendment itself in a world that has seen significant changes 
in communications technologies.92 Berle’s ideas of corporations as quasi 
governments, along with other thinkers of his time, provided the beginning 
to a story that is not yet finished. 
D. The Expansion of Corporate Rights 
Finally, in closing this examination of Berle’s concept of quasi 
governments and subsequent legal history, one additional development 
must be noted—the vast expansion of corporate rights that began in the 
1970s. Just as Berle’s great body of work was reaching its conclusion, a 
new chapter regarding corporations and the Constitution was beginning. 
This, too, is a part of the unfinished story. Instead of the Constitution 
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providing a check on corporate power, as Berle predicted, it became a 
source of additional freedoms from regulation for corporations. 
The Supreme Court had recognized corporations as having rights 
under the Constitution since the early nineteenth century—the concept 
was certainly not new at the time of Berle’s writings.93 Until the twentieth 
century, however, the Court had maintained a well-established distinction 
between property rights that corporations could enjoy and liberty rights 
that they could not.94 A Supreme Court decision in the 1930s abandoned 
this distinction in a case involving newspaper corporations and the 
freedom of the press,95 but it was not until the 1970s that corporations 
began to turn to the First Amendment as a source of political power and as 
a shield against regulation that protected the interests of workers, 
consumers, and the environment.96 
Famously, before he was nominated to serve on the Supreme Court 
in 1971, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., wrote a memorandum for the Chamber of 
Commerce titled Attack on American Free Enterprise System, which 
outlined avenues for business to become more politically engaged to fight 
the growing regulation of business practices.97 Powell identified the courts 
as an essential part of the strategy: “Under our constitutional system, 
especially with an activist-minded Supreme Court, the judiciary may be 
the most important instrument for social, economic and political 
change.”98 The Powell memorandum was just one effort among many that 
spurred the business community to push for greater rights and influence.99 
The 1970s saw the rise of business lobbying, and in a series of 
landmark decisions the Court laid out the groundwork for corporate 
commercial speech protection and political spending rights under the First 
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Amendment.100 These cases culminated in the controversial 2010 decision 
Citizens United v. FEC, which recognized First Amendment protection for 
all corporations to make independent political expenditures.101 One 
scholar’s recent historical empirical analysis found that “after the burst of 
judicial activism under the influence of Justice Powell in the mid-1970s, 
First Amendment cases in which businesses are the primary beneficiary 
have increasingly displaced cases in which individuals are the primary 
beneficiary.”102 
Businesses have also increasingly pushed for religious liberty rights 
in recent years.103 Most notably, in a 2014 case, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., the Court held that for-profit corporations qualify as “persons” 
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and are eligible to claim 
religious exemptions from general laws such as the Affordable Care Act, 
which requires employers to provide certain health care coverage to 
employees.104 Further, in 2018, the Supreme Court heard Masterpiece 
Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, involving a business 
owner who refused to provide a wedding cake for a same-sex couple and 
claimed an exemption from state public accommodations law on free 
exercise and free speech grounds.105 The Court held that the state civil 
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rights commission had violated the business owner’s free exercise rights 
by failing to consider his claim in a neutral and respectful way.106 
Setting these legal developments alongside Berle’s prediction of the 
Constitution serving as a limit on corporate power shows how far he 
missed the mark in his forecast. Perhaps as judicial dissents can plant a 
seed for a future majority opinion, Berle’s concept of corporations as quasi 
governments could serve as a counterpoint to conceptions that too easily 
equate corporations with associations of individuals and rationalize further 
expansions of corporate rights.107 As this story continues, Berle’s other 
concept from the 1950s and 1960s—of inchoate law—proves to be a more 
enduring force. 
II. CORPORATIONS AS SUBJECTS OF INCHOATE LAW 
During the same era that Berle was exploring the idea of corporations 
as quasi governments, he was mapping an understanding of the laws 
affecting corporations. This Part connects his writings on this topic to 
contemporary scholarship and calls for increased social responsibility. 
A. Berle’s Inchoate Law and Echoes in the Literature 
Berle asserted that the laws affecting corporations fall into two 
categories. The first category encompasses “the explicit rules laid down 
by decision or statute and setting out the existing legal capacities and 
liabilities.”108 This category exists without dispute as it encompasses laws 
that are explicitly established on the books. The second, a “more important 
and more difficult category,” Berle referred to as “inchoate law.”109 In his 
words, this latter category “relates to the duties of corporations, not set out 
either in decision or statute, but arising from the impact on social and 
economic situations foreseeably resulting from a corporate course of 
action.”110 
He envisioned a mechanism of legal pushback that arises to limit the 
sphere of corporate action or to establish liability when corporations fail 
to self-regulate within expected social norms of responsibility. According 
to Berle, “When the impact point is reached, it is predictable that a hitherto 
undetermined liability or responsibility will suddenly emerge as explicit 
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law.”111 He did not provide a fully fleshed out theory but articulated that 
new law spurred by the social and economic impact of corporations “might 
come about through sudden demand for and passage of legislation—or 
through decisions of administrative authorities breaking new ground—or 
through court-decision extending judicial action beyond previous limit.”112 
In latent form, this law is inchoate: a mere potential, but perceivable 
nonetheless.113 
Berle provided diverse illustrations. For example, he recounted a 
“public clamor” that resulted when it came to light just before World War 
II that the head of one of the large oil corporations may have authorized 
the sale of petroleum through a neutral country to Nazi Germany.114 After 
significant public outcry, the corporation fired the corporate executive.115 
Contrasting instances like this one in which the corporation took self-
correcting action, Berle discussed situations in which corporations that 
failed to do so became subject to government intervention.116 The steel 
industry incurred a “political intervention on a massive and rather 
disorderly scale” after World War II when companies underestimated steel 
needs and dismantled facilities financed by the government, causing steel 
shortages.117 Congress commenced investigations, the Department of 
Justice sprang into action, and a statistician from the Department of 
Agriculture provided an independent estimate of the country’s steel 
demand.118 In his inaugural address, President Harry Truman stated that 
the government would step in to produce steel if needed.119 These 
responses elicited a pledge by the steel industry to promptly increase 
productive capacity, and Congress passed the Voluntary Allocation Act, 
“an extremely crude system of temporary industrial planning,” to work out 
the allocation of products in short supply under government supervision.120 
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Echoes of Berle’s ideas reverberate in the works of modern writers. 
From scholars who have theorized the development of state corporate law 
in the shadow of federal action121 to those who have examined the laws 
that get passed after financial scandals and crises,122 they have observed a 
similar push and pull of corporate action and societal reaction. These 
scholars have traced the dynamic behind a range of legal developments, 
from the political economy of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act to the changing nature of corporate governance 
provisions in securities regulation. 
One growing literature with parallels to Berle’s concept of inchoate 
law is that of “publicness.”123 Professor Hillary Sale has articulated how 
corporate governance transcends a private law sphere and how the public, 
government, and media have increasing influence over corporations.124 
Like Berle, she has highlighted that corporations that operate in a public 
sphere do so “with changing obligations and an evolving, not a fixed, 
definition.”125 She uses the term publicness in a way that echoes Berle’s 
inchoate law, as both “a process and an outcome” that stem from corporate 
failures, and she advances understandings of private ordering as well as 
regulation.126 Similarly, Professors Donald Langevoort and Robert 
Thompson define publicness generally to refer to “what society demands 
of powerful institutions, in terms of transparency, accountability, and 
openness, in order for that power to be legitimate.”127 They have argued 
that “to a greater extent than generally acknowledged, the broader 
demands of publicness drive the creation of contemporary securities 
regulation.”128 This growing body of work, as well as various other related 
literatures, offers rich accounts and understandings of the relationship 
between corporations and regulatory bodies and the public. 
                                                     
 121. See supra note 15. 
 122. See supra notes 16 & 17. 
 123. See supra note 18. 
 124. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, supra note 18, at 137–38 (“The failure of officers 
and directors to govern in a sufficiently public manner has resulted not only in scandals, but also in 
more public scrutiny of their decisions, powers, and duties.”). 
 125. Id. at 138. 
 126. Sale, Public Governance, supra note 18, at 1012 (“[C]orporate failures expose ‘private’ 
choices . . . . They reveal the lawmakers’ choices about private ordering and self-regulation. They 
highlight the spaces not yet legally defined: those that were omitted. They create pressure for more 
reform and public governance.”). 
 127. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 18, at 340. 
 128. Id. at 341. 
2019] Quasi Governments and Inchoate Law 637 
B. A Description and A Prescription 
Despite some fuzziness in its contours, Berle’s concept of inchoate 
law was not just descriptive but also prescriptive—he wanted lawyers and 
professionals who worked for corporations to monitor the horizon for 
coming shifts in the business environment and law and to self-regulate. He 
wrote: 
It is here suggested that a somewhat similar phenomenon [to a higher 
law] is slowly looming up in the corporate field through the mists that 
hide from us the history of the next generation. There is beginning to 
be apparent a realization of a counter force which checks, and 
remotely acts on, and in time may modify in certain areas the absolute 
power of business discretion. In our system it emerges in time as law; 
and good lawyers watch for it.129 
Expectations had changed. In Berle’s youth, corporate counsel were 
customarily viewed as “tame lawyers” asked to use their professional 
judgment to advise on specific legal problems.130 But by the late 1960s, 
Berle explained that these corporate lawyers had an additional role: 
“sitting at the right hand of the policy-making officers, they have the 
opportunity, if not the duty, to advise upon the possible consequences, 
economic, legal and social, of corporate decision-making.”131 
Corporate managers also bore social responsibility and were subject 
to the vagaries of inchoate law: “The result at all events has been that in a 
range of action, where social, political and human problems are pushed 
up, corporate managements are frequently the first line point of impact. 
They deal with these as best they can; failing, they or others invoke 
political or governmental action.”132 
Berle’s work provides a lens for understanding calls from the 
business community to embrace social responsibility that have followed 
in recent years. Although not pervasive, the trend is clear that influential 
players are willing to take on a more capacious role with an understanding 
of the consequences at stake.133 
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For example, at the start of 2018, the chairperson of BlackRock, the 
world’s largest asset manager, sent an open letter to over 1,000 CEOs, 
explaining: “Society is demanding that companies, both public and 
private, serve a social purpose.”134 He urged the CEOs to “not only deliver 
financial performance” but also make “a positive contribution to society” 
by leading their corporations to benefit all stakeholders, “including 
shareholders, employees, customers, and the communities in which they 
operate.”135 The BlackRock chairperson instructed the executives to 
“understand the societal impact of [their] business as well as the ways that 
broad, structural trends—from slow wage growth to rising automation to 
climate change—affect [the] potential for growth.”136 
Similarly, in 2017, when President Donald Trump was deciding 
whether to pull the United States out of a major international climate 
change accord, thirty CEOs signed an open letter championing continued 
commitment to the agreement.137 In addition, more than 360 institutional 
investors with more than $19 trillion in assets under management signed a 
separate letter in support.138 When the U.S. President decided to exit, a 
group of mayors, governors, university presidents, and more than 100 
businesses, including some of the largest U.S. companies such as Apple, 
Exxon Mobil, and Ford Motor Company, negotiated with the United 
Nations concerning an independent submission to the climate deal.139 
Berle recognized that the dynamic of inchoate law is an imperfect 
one. Social and political forces might be slow to commence or extreme in 
their result.140 As he explained, “Exact justice cannot be expected in these 
situations: someone gets hurt. Yet on the whole community standards for 
corporate action gradually do assert themselves, and capable corporations 
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reach for them and endeavor to meet them.”141 His insight was in providing 
not only an observation about the laws affecting corporations but also a 
proposal for action. 
CONCLUSION 
“I have said more than enough to get into trouble,” Berle remarked 
in closing one of his last publications.142 Although his later work is less 
famous than his writings from the 1930s, it is full of the kinds of insights 
that can provoke, challenge, and indeed perhaps even start a little scholarly 
trouble. 
This essay has aimed to shine light on Berle’s work from the 1950s 
and 1960s, and connect it to contemporary debates. With his concepts of 
corporations as quasi governments and subjects of inchoate law, Berle 
explored various ways in which society could constrain and ameliorate the 
impact of corporate power and ultimately preserve the legitimacy of 
corporations—essential work for generations to come. 
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